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Guanlong Fu, Pengfei Liu , and Stephen K. Swallow
The relative performance of public and private enterprises has been long debated.
We construct a comprehensive violation dataset based on the EPA’s Safe Drinking
Water Information System to empirically investigate the compliance behavior of
publicly and privately owned Public Water Systems (PWSs). Our results show
that publicly owned PWSs commit significantly more Maximum Contamination
Level, Treatment Technique, and Health-Related violations but fewer Monitor
and Reporting violations than privately owned PWSs. We also find that
municipal-level heterogeneities explain a substantial amount of variation in
violation behaviors among PWSs, suggesting water supply quality depends
crucially on location-specific regulations and local economic conditions.
Keywords: Safe Drinking Water Act, Public Utilities, Private Utilities, Water Quality,
Violations
1. Introduction
Water utility privatization in the early 1980s raises concern about whether
privately owned Public Water Systems (PWSs) can outperform publicly
owned utilities (Arnold 2009). Competition is limited in the water utility
industry. Huge capital intensity creates a natural monopoly and a high barrier
to enter the water utility industry. The National Research Council (2002)
reports that “measured by the ratio of net utility plant capital costs to annual
operating revenues, water utilities are more than twice as capital-intensive as
the second-most capital-intensive utility sector, electricity.” Although publicly
owned enterprises may resolve market failures, they have objectives other
than profit maximization, such as public responsibility and political
considerations. Thus, publicly owned enterprises may not achieve full
economic efficiency (Meginnson and Netter 2001). Privately owned water
systems may be more rigorously managed for cost minimization or profit
maximization, while publicly owned facilities might be more sensitive to
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politically based pressures and the perceptions stimulating public reactions.
Publicly owned enterprises also rely more on public funds and face more
financial challenges in poor municipalities. In addition, managers of publicly
owned firms may have opportunities to increase their own welfare at the
expense of the employees and tend to make input choices favoring short-run
benefits during their tenures as managers (Crain, Mark, Zardkoohi 1978).
With distinct incentives driven by the ownership context, we might expect
different performance on various indicators important to achieving the
objectives of the PWS in the public interest. For example, incentives and
employee (or management) response could affect the quality of water
delivered by drinking water systems. Therefore, privately owned facilities are
expected to have an increase in Monitor and Reporting (MR) violations, as
these might offer the opportunity to avoid or delay the costs of responding to
a Maximum Contamination Level (MCL) violation, and privately owned
facilities may be inclined to delay compliance with a Treatment Technique
(TT) regulation that imposes a costly new technology. In contrast, a publicly
owned facility may be particularly sensitive to the public health – and
therefore public protest implications of MCL events – or perhaps be relatively
more compliant with MR regulations because any violation could lead to
politically costly public response.1 Our article qualitatively outlines some of
the incentives that could affect the performance of a public service agent,
using the context of drinking water delivery under the U.S. Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA). We also evaluate whether publicly and privately owned
PWSs perform differently in several different categories of regulatory
violations relative to the SDWA.
To establish a credible relationship, we build a comprehensive dataset
including over 2 million drinking water violation records linked with PWS
characteristics to investigate the relationship between drinking water
violations and PWS ownership types. We address the potential confounding
factors using a set of fixed effects models controlling for the state-level or the
municipality-level heterogeneities. We provide strong empirical evidence that
publicly owned PWSs commit significantly more Maximum Contamination
Level (MCL) and Treatment Technique (TT) violations but fewer Monitor and
Reporting (MR) violations than privately owned PWSs. As already mentioned,
publicly and privately owned utilities have different objective functions, and
the privately owned utilities may choose low-cost compliance actions to
avoid high-cost actions, which is consistent with the empirical results where
the privately owned PWSs tend to commit more MR violations while avoiding
potentially more expensive MCL, TT, and Health-Related violations. Our
results provide new insights on the long-debated relative advantages of
1 According to the EPA, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR) require PWSs
to conduct public notification once they are in violation so that the violations can be visible to the
public quickly.




















































































































private and public utilities in the water supply industry. This study also
contributes to a broadly interesting question about whether ownership
affects public health or creates political incentives that can be seen to both
affect public service outcomes and contribute to the discussion of the
potential roles of the public sector, private companies, and communities in
the drinking water supply market (Bakker 2014).
Literature Review
Results on economic performance of privately and publicly owned utilities.
Several factors are identified that affect the cost of private and public water
utilities. Profit margin requirements, dividends, and income tax usually add
up to 20–30 percent of private utilities’ operation and maintenance costs
(Food & Water Watch 2015). Public utilities’ attention to health contributes
to overstaffing or overdesigning, resulting in cost increases (Wolff and
Hallstein 2005). Suárez-Varela et al. (2017) use directional distance functions,
metafrontiers, and Data Envelopment Analysis to assess efficiency
performance in 70 municipalities in Spain. They find private management is
more efficient in the application of labor input but less efficient at managing
operating costs. Saal and Parker (2001) find that productivity growth has not
improved since the privatization trend of the water and sewage industry in
England and Wales started in 1989, though output price outgrows the input
costs due to the profit increase following privatization. Crain and Zardkoohi
(1978) estimate a log-linear cost function of labor and capital input
controlling for the ownership type. They find that labor productivity in public
water firms is low compared to private water firms, and the capital-labor
ratio doubled in public water utilities when the public utility switched to
private ownership, implying an increase in economic efficiency.
Data acquired by non-profit organizations have been used to quantify the
difference between public and private water facilities. Feigenbaum and
Teeples (1983) estimate a hedonic cost function based on data from the
American Water Works Association (AWWA) for 57 private and 262 public
water companies in 1970. Results suggest no statistically significant
differences in parameter estimates between public and private utility
companies. Similarly, Byrnes, Grosskopf, and Hayes (1986) use a linear
programming approach using data from the AWWA for 59 private and 68
public water companies to calculate the technical and scale efficiency. They
found no significant differences in efficiency across ownership types. Teeples
and Glyer (1987) generalize Feigenbaum and Teeples’s (1983) model by
disaggregating input categories and controlling for additional interaction
terms. Results suggest that overall efficiency differences are insignificant in
the generalized model. Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) use a stochastic frontier
cost function to estimate the cost of the inefficiency for both public and
private water utilities and find that private water utilities are more efficient
with a small operation scale, while public water utilities are more efficient




















































































































with a large-scale operation, possibly due to private water utilities being
relatively more cost burdened while scaling up production.
Other empirical efforts devoted to comparing the price performance show
that privately operated or owned water utilities usually charge significantly
higher water prices to their customers. Porcher (2017) uses a unique dataset
of water utilities with detailed financial indicators (e.g., water utility debt)
and finds that private water utility management is associated with higher
water rates than their public counterparts. However, the price difference
disappears when public water utility debt is taken into consideration, since
debt refunding of the public service could increase the price in the following
years. Chong et al. (2006) employ a switching regression model with a
database of 5,000 French local public authorities and find that the choice of
water utility ownership made by local authorities is not random and that a
Public-Private partnership on average charges a higher water price than
either publicly or privately owned utilities. Similarly, Wait and Petrie (2017)
and Garcia-Valiñas et al. (2013) find that privately owned water utilities have
a higher price of water in the United States and France, respectively.
There are only a few studies comparing water supply quality between
publicly and privately owned water utilities. Food & Water Watch (2015)
suggests that, even though facing the same degree of regulation, private
operators attempt to cut costs by using shoddy construction materials,
delaying needed maintenance, or downsizing the workforce, which impairs
customer service and slows responses to emergencies, while public system
managers have the incentive to provide high water quality, care about public
health, and care about environmental quality as well as associated values
(Wolff and Hallstein 2005). Rahman et al. (2010) identify the characteristics
of PWSs contributing to the violation of MCL standards based on the SDWA
data for 971 PWSs in Arizona. They find that publicly owned PWSs have a
slightly higher probability of violating MCL standards than privately owned
systems. Allaire Wu, and Lall (2018) use probit regression and principal
component analysis with U.S. EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information System
(SDWIS) violations data and water system characteristic data across the
United States from 1982 to 2017. They also find that privately owned PWSs
are associated with a lower rate of MCL compliance.
While the results just stated indicate privately owned PWSs are associated
with fewer MCL violations, this result might be misleading, as there are
several other types of violations. Some PWSs can commit less costly
violations (such as MR) to avoid expensive violations (such as MCL).2 We find
qualitative evidence of strategic or underreporting behaviors for privately
owned utilities in the SDWIS dataset in the comment section. With careful
review of the comment section of MR violations, we observe that a
2 More details regarding the cost of different types of violations will be provided later in this
section.




















































































































substantial number of privately owned PWSs with MR violations missed the
required sample and never submit the missed sample later to their primacy
agencies. Thus, we looked at several major types of violations to get a full
understanding of the relationship between ownership and types of violations.
Existing research also suggests several factors potentially influence both
ownership and water quality violations. For example, Troesken and Geddes
(2003) argued that strict local regulations and high transaction costs are the
cause of water system municipalization at the turn of the 20th century.
Arnold (2009) states that long overdue or delayed investment in
infrastructure in water utilities owned by many municipalities in degenerate
financial situation leads to privatization, aging facilities, and obsolete
services. Wallsten and Kosec (2008) study the relationship between violation
types and PWS ownership types, but they fail to fully control local
heterogeneities that may influence both water quality violation and
ownership types.
2. Background
Drinking water quality can be critical to public health. Congress passed the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) in 1974 and amendments in 1986 and 1996 to
protect the nation’s public drinking water supply. Under the SDWA, the U.S.
EPA promulgated National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR)
(U.S. Government Publishing Office 2019) to set standards and treatment
techniques for more than 90 contaminants (Tiemann 2017). The NPDWR
applies to over 170,000 public water systems (PWSs) that are identified as
having at least 15 service connections or serving at least 25 people per day
for 60 days of the year (Office of Water, U.S. EPA 2004). EPA usually
authorizes states and Indian tribes to assume primary oversight for PWSs to
enforce NPDWR. PWSs should monitor regulated contaminants in their water
supply and report monitoring results to their primacy agencies in order to be
determined as in compliance under NPDWR (Tiemann 2017). PWSs’
violations may lead to enforcement actions such as administrative orders,
financial penalties, and civil actions against PWSs.
Despite established regulations, improper disposal of chemicals, animal
wastes, pesticides, fertilizers, wastes injected to groundwater, and naturally
occurring substances can all contaminate drinking water (Office of Water, U.S.
EPA 2004). For example, the natural occurrence of a moderate to a high level
of arsenic in groundwater is common in western states (Welch, Lico, and
Hughes 1988). EPA’s National Water Quality Inventory (2017) reports that
46 percent of river and stream miles are in poor biological condition and 21
percent of the nation’s lakes are hypereutrophic (i.e., with the highest levels
of nutrients, algae, and plants), where phosphorus and nitrogen are the most
widespread stressors in rivers and lakes. Moreover, enforcement failure,
improper treatment, and poorly maintained distribution systems can
adversely affect drinking water quality (Office of Water, EPA 2004). The Flint




















































































































water crisis is a result of improper treatment and failures at multiple levels of
government (Butler, Scammell, and Benson 2016). The lead crisis in
Washington, DC, in 2001 is a result of the reaction between old lead pipes
and new treatment chemicals applied by the plant to comply with the
Disinfection Byproducts Rule (Renner 2004). Compliance issues also persist
and may negatively impact drinking water quality. The U.S. EPA Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (2013) national public water
systems compliance report finds that MR violation is the dominant violation
type, indicating a large number of PWSs fail to meet monitoring and
reporting frequency rules for the drinking water quality during applicable
compliance periods.
Small PWSs are more likely to violate NPDWRs, due to a lack of resources to
conduct proper operation and maintenance. The U.S. EPA Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance (2013) national public water systems compliance
report suggests that noncompliance occurs more frequently in small PWSs,
despite EPA’s and states’ efforts to develop financial and operational
programs to assist small PWSs to achieve better compliance. Rubin (2013)
reports summary statistics based on the U.S. EPA data for violations by
community water systems (CWSs). Results show that small water systems
are more likely to violate health-related requirements than large systems.
Guerrero-Preston et al. (2008) use a small sample of CWSs over a five-year
period to identify non-compliance with drinking water standards in Puerto
Rico. They found that most small rural systems in Puerto Rico were
noncompliant with NPDWRs during the study period.
PWSs serving low-income and minority communities are more likely to
violate NPDWRs. Balazs et al. (2011) combine water quality monitoring
datasets (1999–2001), source location, and census block group data in
California to study the relationship between CWSs’ nitrate levels and
socioeconomic status of the population served. They find that in smaller
water systems, CWSs serving larger percentages of Latinos and renters
receive drinking water with higher nitrate levels. Balazs et al. (2012) find
similar conclusions in terms of arsenic MCL violations in the same study area.
Pilley et al. (2009) evaluate the applicability of the Promotora Model in Dona
Ana County in New Mexico, where arsenic levels in southern New Mexico are
significantly higher than EPA-designated MCL. The Environmental Justice
Coalition for Water (2005) reports that counties with a high Latino
population have more drinking water violations in California.
Monitoring requirements and violation determinations are different among
contaminants under SDWA and NPDWR (U.S. Government Publishing Office
2019). For inorganic chemicals such as arsenic, annual samples must be
taken for surface water PWSs and triennial samples must be taken for
groundwater PWSs. A PWS is in violation if the sampled contaminant exceeds
the MCL standard set by EPA. PWSs with MCL violations must increase
monitoring or sampling frequency to quarterly, and the violation is
determined based on the annual average of all quarterly samples. For total




















































































































coliform, the number of required routine samples are based on population
served and must be taken at regular intervals each month at representative
sites across every PWS. If a routine sample is total coliform positive, a PWS
must take and analyze one repeat sample at the same tap as the original
sample, and at a location within five connections both upstream and
downstream within one day.
Violations are also dependent on the sampling frequency. A PWS taking fewer
than 40 samples per month is in violation if two or more of their routine and
repeat samples per month are total coliform-positive. A PWS taking more
than 40 samples per month is in violation if more than five percent of routine
and repeat samples per month are total coliform-positive. Stage one
disinfection byproducts3 are mostly monitored quarterly, and the MCL
violation is based on the running annual average of all quarterly samples. For
most of the contaminants, failure to monitor, failure to monitor at a specified
frequency, and failure to report the testing measurement on time are
regarded as MR violations by the state and the EPA.
In lieu of an MCL, NPDWR specifies treatment techniques for specific
biological pathogens (giardia lamblia, viruses, heterotrophic plate count
bacteria, Legionella) and turbidity. Filtration and disinfection are required to
be installed and properly operated to reliably achieve at least 99.9 percent
removal or inactivation of Giardia lamblia, 99.99 percent removal or
inactivation of viruses, fecal coliform concentration no greater than 20/100
ml, and turbidity level no greater 5 NTU.4 Failure to properly install filtration
and disinfection or failure to achieve the above substance level will result in
a treatment technique violation. NPDWR also specifies treatment techniques
for lead and copper instead of an MCL. Small (serving <3,300 persons) and
medium systems (serving 3,300–50,000 persons) with lead and copper
action level exceedance and all large PWSs shall install the optimal corrosion
control treatment steps within the specified time frame or they are in
violation of treatment techniques regulations.
All PWSs already applying optimizing corrosion control treatment shall
monitor water quality parameters designated by the state and will be in
treatment technique (TT) violations if they have an deviation for any
parameters on more than nine days during each six-month monitoring
period. EPA specifies treatment techniques for certain contaminants that
have MCL designations, such as total organic carbon (TOC) in stage 1
3 The Stage 1 Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts (DBP) Rule reduces drinking water
exposure to disinfection byproducts. The Rule applies to community water systems and non-
transient, non-community systems, including those serving fewer than 10,000 people that add a
disinfectant to the drinking water during any part of the treatment process. For more
information, please see https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/stage-1-and-stage-2-disinfectants-and-
disinfection-byproducts-rules#rule-summary.
4 The units of turbidity from a calibrated nephelometer are called Nephelometric Turbidity
Units (NTU).




















































































































Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts (DBP). NPDWR requires PWSs using
conventional filtration treatment to remove specific percentages of TOC that
may react with disinfectants to form DBPs. Removal must be achieved
through a treatment technique (enhanced coagulation or enhanced softening)
unless a system meets alternative criteria.
The cost to comply with MCL and TT regulation is much higher than for MR
violations. As described earlier, complying with MCL and TT regulations
requires good maintenance of the water facilities, proper application of the
treatment process, and appropriate operation of water facility staff, while
complying with MR regulations only requires a PWS to regularly take and
report samples. State agencies and the EPA can conduct formal enforcement
actions such as an administrative order, a judicial referral, or a civil penalty,
as well as informal actions such as issuing a violation notice, requiring public
notification, and bilateral agreement (U.S. EPA 1986). Although U.S. EPA
(1986) only specified the general principle of choosing the appropriate
enforcement response, stronger enforcement action is usually conducted for
severe health-based MCL violations and weaker enforcement actions are
applied to MR violations. In the case of MCL violations, the state may issue
administrative orders that require a PWS to hire engineers to conduct a
feasibility study and a sanitary survey; PWSs may also be required to
conduct new construction or replace parts of their pipes. However, the state
might issue administrative orders that only require a PWS committing a MR
violation to submit the missed sample.
The enforcement dataset of SDWIS shows that the percentage of state
administrative orders is more frequent in MCL violations compared to MR
violations (8.83 percent versus 4.03 percent), suggesting stricter enforcement
of MCL violations. Interestingly, the percentage of “back to compliance” is
smaller in MCL violations than it is for MR violations (24.33 percent versus
35.90 percent), indicating that MR violations may be relatively easy to fix,
while MCL violations are more difficult to resolve. Furthermore, MCL and TT
violations require, respectively, Tier 1 and Tier 2 public notices, while MR
violations only require Tier 3 notice, which is considered less important and
less urgent.5
In summary, the cost of compliance for MCL, TT, and MR violation regulation
varies greatly. Since publicly and privately owned PWSs have distinct objectives
and face possible differences in the cost of compliance with the three types of
regulations, different types of PWSs are likely to commit one type of violation
instead of others when water quality problems arise. We now provide a brief
description of our dataset used in the empirical model.
5 Tier 1 public notice rule requires that the PWS in a situation that might impact human health
must notify the potential affected population immediately, usually within less than 24 hours. Tier 2
requires notice as soon as possible, usually in 30 days. Tier 3 requires notice annually.





















































































































Our data are acquired from the EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information System
(SDWIS), maintained by the EPA Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water.
The SDWIS tracks drinking water contamination levels as required by the
1974 Safe Drinking Water Act and subsequent amendments. The SDWIS also
contains information about water system characteristics and violations of
EPA’s drinking water regulations.
Our water system dataset stores inventory information about 423,469 PWSs,
including the type and ownership, city, county, population served, the number
of connections, main water source, whether it is a water wholesaler, whether it
is primarily serving a daycare, and primacy agency type. We use 370,562
observations for our sample (about 87.51 percent of the total database), for
which we have data on the ownership type. Table 1 lists the types of PWSs
by ownership. There are six different types of ownership recorded, with the
private ownership being the majority type in our sample. We are able to
identify 275,989 PWSs of private ownership, representing about 74.48
percent of the total sample. The PWS characteristics are combined with the
violation information to construct a panel data used in the regression model.
The local government ownership represents 14.13 percent of the total
sample, followed by the public-private co-ownership type, which incorporates
about 4.59 percent of the total PWSs in our sample. State and federal
government ownership types represent about 3.41 percent and 2.95 percent,
respectively. Only about 0.44 percent of the PWSs are owned by Native
American entities.
We generate a set of ownership dummy variables for each ownership
category. We define the dummy Public to include the federal government,
Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Water System Ownership
Owner Type Freq. Percent
Federal Government 10,937 2.95%
Local Government 52,361 14.13%
Public/Private 16,992 4.59%
Native American 1,636 0.44%
Private 275,989 74.48%
State Government 12,647 3.41%
Total 370,562 100
Note: Table 1 lists the frequency distribution of PWSs by ownership types. Based on the 370,562 PWS in
our sample, private is the dominant ownership type, accounting for 275,989 observations, followed by
three public ownership types: local government, state government, and federal government amounting
to 52,361, 12,647, and 10,937 PWSs, respectively. The co-ownership type, Public/Private takes about
16,992 PWS, and the least amount of PWSs is owned by Native Americans.




















































































































state government, and local government ownerships. The dummy variable
Private represents the private ownership type and the dummy Other includes
the Public-Private co-ownership and Native American (Hoppe and Schmitz,
2013). Based on NPDWR, we define the dummy variable, Large, to denote a
large PWS serving more than 50,000 people. Table 2 illustrates the
relationship between PWS ownership type and size. We find that the majority
of publicly owned PWSs, or about 98.74 percent, are either medium PWSs
that serve 3,300 to 50,000 persons or small PWSs that serve less than 3300
people. In addition, the percentage of large PWSs is higher in publicly owned
PWS than in privately owned PWS, 1.26 percent versus 0.06 percent.
The NPDWR has different frequencies of monitoring and degrees of
enforcement on PWSs, depending on the types and water sources, that
potentially contribute to the difference in violation types observed for
publicly and privately owned PWSs. Some PWS types, such as the transient,
non-community water systems (TNCWSs), consisting of gas stations, coffee
shops, and restaurants, are defined as PWSs in this database but might not
operate or be served by any water utilities. We use a dummy variable CWS to
indicate if a PWS belongs to a community water system, and the dummy
variable NTNCWS indicates if a PWS belongs to a non-transient, non-
community water system.6 The PWS type TNCWS is not specified by any
dummy variable and thus is used as a reference level for the other two PWS
Table 2. Water System Ownership and Scale
Small & Medium Large Total
Private 294,433 184 294,617
99.94% 0.06% 79.51%
Public 74,989 956 75,945
98.74% 1.26% 20.49%
Total 369,422 1,140 370,562
99.69% 0.31% 100%
Note: Table 2 illustrates the relationship between PWSs’ ownership type and scale. The numbers below
counts are percentages. Large PWSs are the ones serving more than 50,000 people all year round.
6 Office of Water, U.S. EPA (2004) gave the definition of PWS type: community water systems
(CWSs) supply water to the same population year-round. It serves at least 25 people at their
primary residences or at least 15 residences that are primary residences (for example,
municipalities, mobile home park, subdivisions); Non-transient non-community water systems
(NTNCWSs) regularly supply water to at least 25 of the same people at least six month per
year, but not year-round (for example, schools, factories, office buildings, and hospitals that
have their own water systems); Transient non-community water systems (TNCWSs) provide
water to 25 or more people for at least 60 days/year but not to the same people and not on a
regular basis (for example, gas stations, campgrounds, restaurants with their own water systems).




















































































































type dummies. The dummy variable GW indicates if a PWS has a groundwater
source, and the variable SW indicates surface water source.
Our dataset also contains several other dummy variables such as Wholesaler,
indicating whether a public water system is a water wholesaler; Daycare,
indicating whether it mainly serves daycare centers; a set of dummies indicating
primacy agency type of PWS, with Primacy_state being a dummy representing
that a state is the primacy agency and Primacy_territory representing Indian
tribes being the primacy agency. We use Connections to record the numbers
of connections and Population to reflect the population PWS serves. Table 3
provides descriptive statistics for PWS-associated characteristics.
The violation dataset stores violations detected by assessment based on
sample results or reviews, including the category and type of contaminants
associated with the violation and the time period when the PWS is in the
detected violation records. Table 4 shows the frequency of each category of
violation. The Monitoring and Reporting (MR) Violation is by far the most
frequent violation and represents 74.97 percent of the total violations,
followed by Maximum Contaminant Level Violations (or MCL, 9.55 percent)
and Treatment Technique Violations (TT, 1.58 percent). Other types of
violations only make up a small percentage of the total violations. As a result,
we only focus on MR, MCL, and TT violations.
4. Model Specification
In this section, we discuss our econometric framework to identify the
relationship between PWS ownership and types of violations. We first create
a set of dummy variables to present MCL, MR, and TT violations, each taking
integer values and representing the counts of certain types of violations that
happened in a PWS in any given year. Our violation records include PWSs
from 1950 to 2017. However, the data before 1988 is scarce. Therefore, we
constructed a panel dataset for each PWS across years and only kept the
records after 1988 (dropping about 5 percent of all the records), when the
Lead and Copper Rule was enforced, which initiated the time when the
majority of violations took place. The violation dataset is then merged with
the water system dataset on a PWS-year basis with the water system data.
We converted the Population variable into a set of dummy variable
Population Categories, i.e., one dummy for each of the population categories
with the cutoff points 500, 3,300, and 10,000 to better control for the scale
of PWSs. Our population categories follow EPA designations in the 2013
National Public Water Systems compliance report, and the same
categorization is also used in Allaire et al. (2018).
If a PWS was deactivated before 2017, its violation record would only be kept
up to the deactivation year in the panel dataset. Our panel dataset contains
6,384,636 violation records from 317,587 PWSs. Note that the panel dataset
is imbalanced, as some PWSs were deactivated before 2017. Our constructed
dataset enables us to track down the violation information for a PWS in a given year.




















































































































We specify the following regression model
yit ¼ γ Ownershipit þ βXit þ ηl þ ηt þ eit ,
where yit is the dependent variable recording the number of occurrences of a
certain violation for PWS i in year t. As noted before, the types of violations
considered in the empirical model include MCL, MR, and TT violations.7 The
Table 3. Water System Characteristics

















Variable (Continuous) Mean Std. Dev
Connections 448.941 33068.2
Population 1121.301 28506.61
Note: Dummy variables with the value “1” indicate corresponding PWS types or characteristics and “0”
otherwise. We use the dummy variable CWS to indicate whether a PWS is a community water system,
and the dummy variable NTNCWS to indicate whether a PWS is non-transient, non-community water
system. The dummy variable GW indicates if a PWS has a groundwater source, and the variable SW
indicates whether a PWS uses a surface water source. Our dataset also contains several other dummy
variables such as Wholesaler, indicating whether a PWS is a water wholesaler, Daycare, indicating
whether a PWS mainly serves a daycare, and a set of dummies indicating PWSs’ primacy agency type,
state or territory (Indian tribes). We use the continuous variable Connections, which records the
numbers of connections.
7 In the Supplementary Appendix, Table A1, we summarize the the distribution of cumulative
violation records for public and private PWSs across four violation types. Results show




















































































































dummy variable Ownership consists of a set of dummy variables, including
Public and Other, using the private ownership as the baseline for comparison.
The Xit is a set of control variables associated with the PWS. Our control
variables include the dummy variables GW, CWS, NTNCWS, Wholesaler,
Daycare, Primacy_state, Primacy_territory, Population Categories, and the
continuous variable Connections. The ηl captures the location fixed effects and
ηt includes the set of time fixed effects. The idiosyncratic error term is
denoted as εit. We specify several models, allowing for different sets of
controls. In some specifications, we include the interaction terms of the
dummy Ownership and the dummy Large, i.e. Public*Large and Other*Large,
which enables us to better control for the correlation between the ownership
of and the scale of a PWS, since large PWSs may have more resources to
comply with NPDWR (Bhattacharyya et al. 1995). The time fixed effects are
at the yearly level and the location fixed effects are controlled at either the
state level or the municipal level.8
To obtain unbiased estimates, our identification assumption requires
E(Ownershipit  eitjXit , ηl , ηt) ¼ 0,
which assumes, after controlling for observed PWS characteristics and
unobserved time-invariant location and time fixed effects, confounders do not











Note: Violation types include Maximum Contaminant Level Violations (MCL), Monitoring (MON),
Monitoring and Reporting Violations (MR), Maximum Residual Disinfectant Level (MRDL), Other types
of violation (Other), Reporting violation (RPT), and Treatment Technique Violations (TT),
significant differences in violation occurrence between public and private ownerships based on
summary statistics (p< 0.001, using t-test and test of proportions).
8 The “municipal level fixed effects” is a general term used to represent the municipal, township,
city, or county level (a single administrative division) fixed effects.




















































































































exist that both affect ownership types and the occurrence of violations. To
control for these potential confounding factors in our regression model, we
use the state level or municipal level fixed effects to control for location
heterogeneities in terms of regulations, transaction costs, and economic
conditions, although time-varying confounders may still bias our coefficient
estimate. The majority of changes of PWS ownership type happened at the
turn of the 20th century and during the 1980s (Troesken and Geddes 2003;
Arnold 2009; Brubaker 2003), so it is reasonable to assume that there is
little influence of time-varying confounders during our data window from
1988 to 2017, when only less than one percent of PWSs experienced an
ownership change. We also use a variety of model specifications to assess the
robustness of estimation.
5. Results
Our first set of regression results is presented in Table 5. The dependent
variables are the number of MCL, MR, and TT violations that occurred in a
given year for a PWS in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. The location fixed
effects, wherever controlled for, are at the state level. Column (1) includes
the ownership type dummy variables and the PWS associated control
variables defined earlier. We did not include the year or the location fixed
effects in Column (1). Column (2) adds the year fixed effects, and Column (3)
adds the location fixed effects, in addition to the variables included in
Column (1). Column (4) adds both the year and location fixed effects based
on Column (1). Column (5) includes interaction terms of the ownership type
dummies and the dummy Large, i.e., Public*Large and Other*Large, with year
and location fixed effects. Panel A in Table 5 suggests that the publicly owned
PWSs commit significantly more MCL violations compared to privately owned
PWSs, and the estimates for the dummy Public decrease from 0.00984 to
0.00453 as we add more controls from Column (1) to Column (5). The
largest decrease appears from Column (2) to (3), where the coefficient
changes from 0.0083 to 0.00534, suggesting that location fixed effects explain
a large amount of variations in the MCL violations. As expected, our results
also suggest that large PWSs commit significantly fewer MCL violations. In
addition, the interaction effect of Public*Large in Column (5) of Panel A is
significant, suggesting that the difference between public and private
ownership is further moderated by the scale of the PWSs.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the regression results of the MR violation. Our
results consistently show the publicly owned PWSs commit significantly
fewer MR violations with the coefficient ranges from 0.085 to 0.095
compared to privately owned PWSs. One possible explanation is that
privately owned PWSs might not submit monitored samples to their primacy
agencies and intentionally commit MR violations to avoid more expensive
MCL violations when water quality issues arise with the PWS water facility
or treatment process. The estimates for Large are not consistent across all




















































































































Table 5. Regression Results of Violation Occurrence: State Fixed Effects
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Panel A: MCL Violation
Public 0.00984*** 0.00883*** 0.00534*** 0.00464*** 0.00453***
(0.000360) (0.000358) (0.000367) (0.000364) (0.000365)
Other 0.00345*** 0.00134* 0.00174* 0.00422*** 0.00418***
(0.000672) (0.000668) (0.000728) (0.000724) (0.000725)
Large 0.0411*** 0.0455*** 0.0338*** 0.0385*** 0.0628***





Constant 0.0562*** 0.0308*** 0.0427*** 0.0177*** 0.0177***
(0.00188) (0.00196) (0.00194) (0.00201) (0.00201)
N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Panel B: MR Violation
Public 0.0850*** 0.0922*** 0.0889*** 0.0937*** 0.0947***
(0.00374) (0.00373) (0.00380) (0.00379) (0.00380)
Other 0.356*** 0.374*** 0.0647*** 0.0848*** 0.0849***
(0.00698) (0.00696) (0.00756) (0.00753) (0.00754)
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Table 5. Continued
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)





Constant 0.622*** 0.398*** 0.789*** 0.571*** 0.571***
(0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0209) (0.0209)
N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Panel C: TT Violation
Public 0.00200*** 0.00184*** 0.00113*** 0.00102*** 0.000964***
(0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000168) (0.000168) (0.000168)
Other 0.00216*** 0.00247*** 0.00324*** 0.00362*** 0.00362***
(0.000307) (0.000307) (0.000333) (0.000333) (0.000334)
Large 0.0101*** 0.0108*** 0.00765*** 0.00845*** 0.0201***





Constant 0.0312*** 0.0260*** 0.0272*** 0.0221*** 0.0220***
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N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** indicates P< 0.001, ** indicates P< 0.05, and * indicates P< 0.1. Standard errors are in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. For Panels
A, B, and C, the dependent variables are the number of MCL, MR, or TT violations committed by a public water system in a given year, respectively. The Public
stands for the public ownership type; Other represents the other ownership type; Large stands for large PWS, Public*Large stands for large publicly owned PWS,
and Other*Large stands for large PWS with the ownership type “Other.” Column (1) includes the ownership type dummy variables, Public and Other, and control
variables do not include the year or the location fixed effects. Column (2) adds the year fixed effects, and Column (3) adds the location fixed effects, in addition to
the variables included in Column (1). Column (4) adds both the year and location fixed effects based on Column (1). Column (5) includes interaction terms of the
ownership type dummies and the dummy Large, i.e., Public*Large and Other*Large, with both year and location fixed effects. Location fixed effects controlled for
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specifications and are negative and significant at a 5 percent level in Column (5)
when interaction terms such as Public*Large are included.
Panel C presents the regression results of the TT violation. Regression results
suggest that publicly owned PWSs commit significantly more TT violations
compared to privately owned PWSs, and the estimated coefficient ranges
from 0.002 to 0.000964. Adding more controls gradually reduces the
magnitude of the coefficient. Table 5 provides consistent evidence that
privately owned PWSs commit more MR violations while reducing potential
MCL and TT violations.
Table 6 is similar to Table 5, except we use a stronger location control, the
municipality fixed effects instead of the state fixed effects. Panel A shows that
publicly owned PWSs commit significantly more MCL violations than
privately owned PWSs. Panel B suggests that the publicly owned PWSs
commit significantly fewer MR violations compared to privately owned PWSs,
and panel C shows that publicly owned PWSs commit slightly more TT
violations than privately owned PWSs. Table 6 reconfirms that coefficients
estimated for treatment variable Public are robust after controlling for
different levels of location fixed effects.
Comparing Tables 5 and 6, we find that coefficient estimates for Public
become smaller after controlling for the municipality fixed effects instead of
the state fixed effects, indicating that municipality fixed effects explain a
larger amount of variations for the MCL and TT violations. In addition, we
find that the interaction term between Public and Large is smaller for MCL
and TT violations and no longer significant for MR violations after controlling
for municipality fixed effects, implying that large publicly owned PWSs may
commit more MCL and TT violations than privately owned and small or
medium PWSs regardless of the degree of location heterogeneities controlled.
This result may also be related to the underreporting behavior of privately
owned and small or medium PWSs, since large publicly owned PWSs are not
significantly committing more MR violations when controlling for
municipality fixed effects, as shown in Panel B of Table 6.
Table 7 presents the regression results using the number of Health-Related
violations of a PWS in a given year as the dependent variable. Panel A
controls for the state-level fixed effects and Panel B controls for the
municipal-level fixed effects. Interestingly, we find the publicly owned utilities
incur significantly more Health-Related violations compared to privately
owned utilities. While a large utility generally commits a lower Health-
Related violation, the interaction term Public*Large is positively significant.
Adding more controls reduces the magnitude of coefficient estimates, and
using a municipality-level fixed effects model further reduces the magnitude,
though the coefficient is highly significant across all specifications. We only
keep several key variables in the tables and leave the full model estimation
results to the Supplementary Appendix, Tables A2 and A3. Based on the full
model, we find the community water system (CWS) significantly increases all
types of violations; the non-transient, non-community water system




















































































































Table 6. Regression Results of Violation Occurrence: Municipality Fixed Effects
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Panel A: MCL Violation
Public 0.00984*** 0.00883*** 0.00424*** 0.00335*** 0.00328***
(0.000360) (0.000358) (0.000406) (0.000403) (0.000404)
Other 0.00345*** 0.00134* 0.00269*** 0.000170 0.000177
(0.000672) (0.000668) (0.000773) (0.000769) (0.000769)
Large 0.0411*** 0.0455*** 0.0293*** 0.0348*** 0.0528***





Constant 0.0562*** 0.0308*** 0.0180*** 0.00997** 0.00998**
(0.00188) (0.00196) (0.00330) (0.00333) (0.00333)
N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Panel B: MR Violation
Public 0.0850*** 0.0922*** 0.0927*** 0.0989*** 0.0995***
(0.00374) (0.00373) (0.00426) (0.00424) (0.00425)
Other 0.356*** 0.374*** 0.157*** 0.178*** 0.178***
(0.00698) (0.00696) (0.00811) (0.00808) (0.00809)
Large 0.00262 0.0292 0.0918*** 0.0523* 0.0484
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Table 6. Continued
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Other*Large 0.315
(0.195)
Constant 0.622*** 0.398*** 0.416*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0346) (0.0350) (0.0350)
N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Panel C: TT Violation
Public 0.00200*** 0.00184*** 0.000691*** 0.000553** 0.000505**
(0.000164) (0.000164) (0.000186) (0.000186) (0.000186)
Other 0.00216*** 0.00247*** 0.000634 0.00102** 0.00102**
(0.000307) (0.000307) (0.000354) (0.000354) (0.000355)
Large 0.0101*** 0.0108*** 0.00635*** 0.00729*** 0.0185***





Constant 0.0312*** 0.0260*** 0.0236*** 0.0180*** 0.0180***
(0.000860) (0.000899) (0.00151) (0.00153) (0.00153)
N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** indicates P< 0.001, ** indicates P< 0.05, and * indicates P< 0.1. Standard errors are in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. For Panels
A, B, and C, the dependent variables are the number of MCL, MR, or TT violations committed by a PWS in a given year, respectively. Location fixed effects
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Table 7. Regression Results of Health-Related Violation
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Panel A: Health-Related Violation, State Fixed Effects
Public 0.0119*** 0.0107*** 0.00649*** 0.00567*** 0.00551***
(0.000407) (0.000404) (0.000414) (0.000412) (0.000413)
Other 0.00128 0.00114 0.00498*** 0.00784*** 0.00780***
(0.000759) (0.000755) (0.000823) (0.000818) (0.000819)
Large 0.0511*** 0.0564*** 0.0415*** 0.0469*** 0.0830***





Constant 0.0874*** 0.0568*** 0.0699*** 0.0398*** 0.0398***
(0.00213) (0.00221) (0.00219) (0.00227) (0.00227)
N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Panel B: Health-Related Violation, Municipality Fixed Effects
Public 0.0119*** 0.0107*** 0.00495*** 0.00392*** 0.00379***
(0.000407) (0.000404) (0.000458) (0.000455) (0.000456)
Other 0.00128 0.00114 0.00205* 0.000861 0.000853
(0.000759) (0.000755) (0.000873) (0.000868) (0.000868)
Large 0.0511*** 0.0564*** 0.0357*** 0.0421*** 0.0713***
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Table 7. Continued





Constant 0.0874*** 0.0568*** 0.0415*** 0.00796* 0.00795*
(0.00213) (0.00221) (0.00373) (0.00376) (0.00376)
N 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636 6384636
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** indicates P< 0.001, ** indicates P< 0.05 and * indicates P< 0.1. Standard errors are in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. For Panels
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(NTNCWS) also significantly increases all types of violations, compared to the
baseline transient non-community water system (TNCWS). In addition, if a
PWS has a groundwater (GW) source, the PWS is more likely to incur MCL,
TT, and Health-Related violations but less likely to incur MR violations.
Our main results reveal systematic differences between the public and private
utilities on the types of violations. We find strong evidence that publicly owned
utilities are more likely to commit costly violations such as MCL and TT, and
privately owned utilities are more likely to commit less costly MR violations.
Our results are consistent with the story that privately owned utilities may
intentionally commit MR violations instead of MCL and TT violations since
the MCL and TT violations are more costly to resolve. We also find that
public utilities are more likely to commit Health-Related violations. However,
since privately owned utilities commit more MR violations, some Health-
Related violations are less likely to be detected due to more MR violations for
private utilities. We do not believe our results indicate drinking water
provided by the public utility is less safe compared to water provided by the
private utility. Due to data limitations, we are unable to fully explore this
hypothesis. Future research can combine drinking water-related disease with
the drinking water source to determine whether there is a systematic
difference in terms of drinking water-related disease between public and
private drinking water utilities. We also use a Tobit model where the
dependent variable is the cumulative violation records, as the dependent
variable is highly skewed to zero. The regression results for the Tobit model
are provided in the Supplementary Appendix, Table A4. Our main conclusions
remain the same, and the regression results are consistent with fixed effects
models on the directions and significance of major coefficients, though the
magnitudes of the coefficients are different after we change the dependent
variable.
6. Robustness check with the CWS subsample
The PWSs consist of the community (CWS) and non-community systems. The
non-community system further consists of the transient (TNCWS) and non-
transient (NTNCWS) system. Since NTNCWSs contain schools, factories, office
buildings, and hospitals that have their own water systems, and TNCWSs
contain gas stations, resorts, restaurants, and motels with their own systems
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2014), NTNCWSs and TNCWSs
might not be operating or be served by any actual water utilities. These two
types of PWSs might not sell water as their main goal of the operation and
not have the complete infrastructure and management system as regular
water utilities do. As a result, they might have different incentives and
operation practices compared to actual water utilities. For example, a coffee
shop might apply a commercial water filter, which might not be as effective
in treating water as the technique used in a water utility, while the coffee
shop manager cares about their water service quality as much as a publicly




















































































































Table 8. Regression Results of Violation Occurrence for the CWS Subsample
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Panel A: MCL Violation
Public 0.0220*** 0.0171*** 0.0124*** 0.00812*** 0.00789***
(0.00101) (0.00100) (0.00106) (0.00105) (0.00105)
Other 0.00646** 0.00760** 0.00248 0.00367 0.00340
(0.00244) (0.00242) (0.00278) (0.00276) (0.00277)
Large 0.0513*** 0.0590*** 0.0394*** 0.0473*** 0.0664***





Constant 0.104*** 0.0526*** 0.0899*** 0.0396*** 0.0398***
(0.00415) (0.00455) (0.00447) (0.00483) (0.00483)
N 1781001 1781001 1771425 1771425 1771425
Panel B: MR Violation
Public 0.0777*** 0.117*** 0.0657*** 0.100*** 0.104***
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Other 1.744*** 1.752*** 0.199*** 0.209*** 0.209***
(0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Large 0.0133 0.0691 0.0862* 0.0281 0.212*
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Other*Large 0.00551
(0.317)
Constant 0.0200 0.520*** 1.135*** 0.644*** 0.643***
(0.0430) (0.0472) (0.0462) (0.0501) (0.0501)
N 1781001 1781001 1771425 1771425 1771425
Panel C: TT Violation
Public 0.00494*** 0.00414*** 0.00250*** 0.00180*** 0.00165***
(0.000463) (0.000463) (0.000484) (0.000484) (0.000486)
Other 0.0136*** 0.0138*** 0.0130*** 0.0132*** 0.0132***
(0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00128) (0.00128) (0.00128)
Large 0.0209*** 0.0222*** 0.0169*** 0.0182*** 0.0295***





Constant 0.0333*** 0.0204*** 0.0285*** 0.0157*** 0.0157***
(0.00190) (0.00210) (0.00205) (0.00223) (0.00223)
N 1781001 1781001 1771425 1771425 1771425
Panel D: Health-Related Violation
Public 0.0270*** 0.0213*** 0.0150*** 0.00994*** 0.00956***
(0.00115) (0.00114) (0.00120) (0.00119) (0.00120)
Other 0.0201*** 0.0215*** 0.0155*** 0.0169*** 0.0167***
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Table 8. Continued
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5)
Large 0.0722*** 0.0812*** 0.0562*** 0.0656*** 0.0959***





Constant 0.138*** 0.0730*** 0.118*** 0.0553*** 0.0555***
(0.00472) (0.00517) (0.00508) (0.00549) (0.00550)
N 1781001 1781001 1771425 1771425 1771425
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes


















Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 74.103.217.93, on 04 Nov 2020 at 17:45:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
owned PWSmanager does, since their quality of water determines the quality of
their coffee and guarantees their food security. The percentages of public and
private PWSs in the community and non-community systems are summarized
in Table A5. We find the publicly owned CWSs represents 40.72 percent of
the facilities in the CWS subsample, a much higher percentage compared to
the full sample of 21.04 percent.
To control for the systematic differences in incentives and operation practices
between CWSs and non-community systems, we run additional regression with
the CWS subsample only. Regression results are presented in Table 8,
suggesting that publicly owned PWSs commit significantly more MCL, TT, and
Health-Related violations but fewer MR violations than privately owned
PWSs, after we control for the time and location fixed effects. Therefore,
when restricting our analysis to only the CWSs, our main conclusions still
hold. Our regression results using the CWS subsample further support our
hypothesis that privately owned PWSs may commit more MR violations while
preventing potential MCL, TT, and Health-Related violations.
7. Conclusion
In this article, we review the National Primary Drinking Water Regulation and
compare different drinking water regulations as well as their violation
determinations. We find that MCL and TT violations are associated with high
compliance costs and violation penalties, which may lead PWSs to choose
different compliance actions. We then construct a comprehensive violation
dataset based on the U.S. EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information System to
conduct our empirical analyses. We find that publicly owned PWSs commit
significantly more MCL and TT violations but fewer MR violations compared
to privately owned PWS. Our results are robust to different model
specifications, including controlling for potential interaction effects, yearly
fixed effects, and location fixed effects at the state or municipal level.
We assume that given all observed PWS characteristics, year fixed effects, and
location fixed effects, there are no other confounding factors that both affect
PWS ownership determination and PWS water supply quality violations.
Based on this assumption, our analyses show that publicly owned PWSs still
commit significantly more MCL, TT, and Health-Related violations than
privately owned PWSs. Our article does not explore the mechanism behind
the observed differences explicitly. However, empirical evidence suggests
potential strategic or underreporting behaviors for privately owned utilities.
We suspect that PWS operators may choose not to submit the required
sample when the operators know that there is something wrong with their
water system facilities or treatment process. Therefore, privately owned
PWSs can avoid fixing potential MCL and TT violations, both of which involve
more costly penalty and stringent enforcement actions, while committing less
costly MR violations. We have not considered the price difference explicitly
between the public and private PWSs. The local economic condition might




















































































































lead to municipalities outsourcing their water utilities to private parties, which
in turn leads to high water prices and better service quality. Our location fixed
effects can control for the heterogeneity in local economic conditions. Future
studies with additional price information could explore on whether water
price is a potential mechanism through which the ownership affects different
types of violations rates.
Our regression analyses confirm that the difference between public and
private PWSs is highly significant across all specifications. We also show that
the estimates for the dummy Public are smaller when we control for
municipality fixed effects instead of state fixed effects, which suggests that
finer location heterogeneities explain a substantial amount of the variation of
MCL, TT, and Health-Related violations. Our results also have important
implications for distributing government and private funding to improve
drinking water infrastructure. The government implements various programs,
such as the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund, Community Development
Block Grant Program, and Small Community Water Infrastructure Exchange
to improve drinking water quality. Our regression results show that the
efforts to improve municipal water supply quality should take the utility
ownership into consideration and focus on dealing with the location
disadvantages, such as the poor financial situation of local government, to
increase the efficiency of current funding programs.
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